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COMMENTARY 
Pleau-Sharing 
JONAH J. HORWITZ†  
Federalism is a hot topic at the moment. With the 
Supreme Court having just ruled on the most significant 
conflict between the states and the national government 
since the New Deal,1 the issue has greater currency with the 
public than it has had in decades. As with many such 
debates, however, the struggle over healthcare reform is not 
really about federalism. The Commerce Clause has simply 
provided a convenient constitutional garb for advocates on 
all sides. By and large, such advocates do not purport to be 
centrally motivated by a concern for states’ freedom from 
national interference. Rather, they talk about the freedom 
of the individual (the law’s critics), the needs of the indigent 
(the law’s defenders), and fiscal responsibility (both). That is 
not to say that the healthcare debate is a sham. No doubt a 
healthy discussion can be had over the constitutional 
balance of power between the states and the federal 
government, even when the combatants’ motivations have 
more to do with other matters. Perhaps the passions of the 
participants sharpen the constitutional debate. Indeed, 
perhaps some considerations that seem removed from the 
relationship between the nation and the states are actually 
not so removed.2 
  
 † BA with honors, 2006, Swarthmore College. JD cum laude, Order of the 
Coif, 2010, Northwestern University School of Law.  
 1. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 2. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (holding that the 
commerce clause affords individuals a cause of action against states interfering 
with their right to engage in interstate commerce). 
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Nevertheless, there are surely times when a 
conversation about federalism should be focused on 
federalism, times when we should return to the roots of the 
concept and revisit the fundamental question of what 
powers are granted to which sovereign. Such conversations 
are most fruitfully had about powers traditionally reserved 
to one government and encroached upon by another. For in 
that instance, unlike cases where courts wrestle with 
uniquely modern activity that does not fit neatly into the 
historical federalist paradigm,3 we can clearly see the 
evolution of our federalist system, and we can thoughtfully 
consider whether or not we like the direction we are headed.  
There are few areas more traditionally dominated by 
one sovereign over the other than the prosecution of 
commonplace crimes.4 And there are few judicial decisions 
that more blithely disregard that tradition than the recent 
First Circuit decision, United States v. Pleau.5 The majority 
opinion in that case is a stark reminder of just how far the 
conventional distinctions between the sovereigns have 
collapsed. It is also a stark reminder of how such collapses 
can occur almost invisibly, through erosion and passing 
remarks rather than landmark cases and seminal holdings. 
Some cursory background. In 2010, Jason Pleau robbed 
and murdered a gas station manager who was making a 
bank deposit in Rhode Island.6 While in state custody for a 
parole violation, a federal grand jury indicted him for 
robbery affecting commerce and use of a firearm during and 
in relation to a crime of violence resulting in death.7 The 
federal government sought custody of Pleau to charge him 
with the offenses, which potentially carried with them a 
penalty of death.8 Because Lincoln Chafee, the Governor of 
  
 3. See, e.g., United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(applying commerce clause jurisprudence to the Internet). 
 4. See, e.g., Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 20 (2006) 
(“[R]espondents’ Hobbes Act interpretation broadens the Act’s scope beyond 
what case law has assumed. It would federalize much ordinary criminal 
behavior, ranging from simple assault to murder, behavior that typically is the 
subject of state, not federal, prosecution.”). 
 5. United States v. Pleau, 680 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (en banc).  
 6. Id. at 3. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. The federal government has since announced it will seek the death 
penalty for Pleau. See Katie Mulvaney, State of R.I. Seeks U.S. Supreme Court 
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Rhode Island, is opposed to capital punishment, he refused 
to hand Pleau over.9 By the time the case reached the First 
Circuit, Pleau involved a host of complicated jurisdictional 
and procedural issues that are not centrally relevant to this 
commentary.10 Its reference to the principal concern 
examined here—the increasing, and increasingly 
surreptitious, federalization of ordinary criminal 
prosecution—is mentioned only in passing. Which is, in a 
sense, exactly the point. 
Here is the passing remark. The majority opinion, 
written by the eminent jurist Judge Boudin for himself and 
two other members of the en banc court, announced: “That 
there is an overriding federal interest in prosecuting 
defendants indicted on federal crimes needs no citation . . . 
.”11 In a scholarly opinion published in a high-profile case for 
a respected court and by a prominent judge, it is no small 
matter to declare that a proposition does not require any 
authority. It is puzzling, therefore, that Judge Boudin 
would find it unnecessary to support this proposition, which 
is far from self-evident.  
As an initial matter, it is important to note that this 
essay does not purport to answer the dispositive questions 
at issue in the dispute between the United States and 
Rhode Island, or those at issue in the dispute between the 
majority and the dissent. Those questions entail complex 
matters of statutory analysis and habeas jurisprudence too 
thorny to untangle in the short space allotted. And, in any 
event, it is clear that the concern articulated here cannot 
resolve the controversy. For, as observed below, even the 
dissent does not dispute the proposition quoted above and 
critiqued here. That too is part of the very problem under 
consideration: that even a scathing dissent written to 
defend state sovereignty in one narrow case accepts without 
comment a wildly sweeping condemnation of state 
  
Review in Pleau Death Penalty Case, PROVIDENCE J. (Aug. 21, 2012), http://news. 
providencejournal.com/breaking-news/2012/08/state-seeks-us.html.  
 9. Pleau, 680 F.3d at 3. 
 10. Many of the issues relate to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, a 
compact between the separate states and the federal government concerning the 
exchange of prisoners between different jurisdictions. See id. at 3-5. 
 11. Id. at 7.  
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sovereignty in a much broader context. The problem, in a 
nutshell, is one of tone.  
“That there is an overriding federal interest in 
prosecuting defendants indicted on federal crimes” is a 
freestanding proposition on a high level of generality.12 
Judge Boudin, a careful drafter, included within the 
sentence no indication that it bore any close connection to 
the legal issues in the case at bar. He did not say, “there is 
an overriding federal interest in prosecuting defendants 
indicted on federal crimes in a dispute over the terms of the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers” or “in a dispute over 
the proper application of habeas law.” With presumed 
calculation, he said simply that “there is an overriding 
federal interest in prosecuting defendants indicted on 
federal crimes.”13 Period. The assumption that Judge Boudin 
meant what he said as he said it is further bolstered by the 
fact that he saw fit to announce the lack of authority, and 
confirmed by the fact that the dissent tacitly treated the 
statement as an abstract (and true) proposition, rather than 
a necessary building-block of the majority’s flawed 
reasoning.    
Now, in a different case, it could very well be true that 
the proposition is so obvious as to render a citation 
superfluous. Imagine, for example, a criminal defendant 
complaining to an assistant U.S. attorney that he should 
not be forced to answer for his offense because he had 
parental obligations, spousal obligations, or business 
obligations. Then it would make sense to respond, 
scoffingly, that an overriding federal interest eclipsed his 
own. Or, to bring the matter slightly closer to plausibility, 
imagine an elected official urging a federal judge to dismiss 
an indictment because it would impair his ability to serve 
the people. The judge would likely be on firm ground to 
shoot the motion down, because there is an overriding 
federal interest in seeing corrupt politicians removed from 
office and punished.  
But what exactly does it mean for there to be an 
overriding federal interest in transplanting a single, fairly 
unremarkable defendant from a state prison to a federal 
prison? The only explanation with any persuasive force is 
  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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that different penalties will be available to Pleau’s federal 
prosecutors than to Rhode Island. Indeed, that is the 
Governor’s stated reason for declining the federal request in 
the first place: that he does not believe in the death penalty, 
and that the Department of Justice could pursue one if it so 
chooses. It is difficult to see, however, how the federal 
government’s interest in seeing Pleau, the robber and 
murderer of a gas station manager, die by the hand of an 
executioner carrying out a federal death sentence rather 
than die during or after a lengthy stay in a state prison, 
could meaningfully be described as overriding, let alone how 
it could be described as such in passing and with no 
authority. Nor can it be ignored that the federal government 
very seldom executes anyone in today’s day and age14 and 
generally reserves the punishment for the perpetrators of 
truly egregious offenses.15 If there is any proposition in the 
opinion that required a citation, it would be this one! 
Ultimately, Judge Boudin cannot really mean “[t]hat 
there is an overriding federal interest in prosecuting 
defendants indicted on federal crimes” in such a way as to 
be applicable to Pleau. What he must mean instead, in 
keeping with the tenor of the increasing federalization of 
run-of-the-mill crimes, is that there is an overriding federal 
interest in the federal government calling the shots in 
Pleau’s prosecution, rather than Rhode Island and 
regardless of what Rhode Island would presumably do to 
him. In other words, there is an overriding federal interest 
in a federal attorney (not a state attorney) charging Pleau 
under federal statutes (not state statutes); and a federal 
interest in a federal judge (not a state judge) sentencing him 
to a federal prison (not a state prison). It matters not that 
the process and end result would likely be very similar. The 
point is that the federal government is the federal 
government. If it wants Jason Pleau, it gets him.  
  
 14. See, e.g., Michele Martinez Campbell, Federalism and Capital 
Punishment: New England Stories, 36 VT. L. REV. 81, 81 (2011) (“Federal death 
sentences represent only 0.53% of death sentences imposed in the United 
States.”). 
 15. Timothy McVeigh, for instance, one of the men responsible for the 
Oklahoma City bombing, was one of the last people executed by the federal 
government. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, Executions of Federal Prisoners 
(Since 1927), http://www.bop.gov/about/history/execchart.jsp (last visited Sept. 
19, 2012).  
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Again, this critique is not meant to attack the result 
reached by the First Circuit. The case law may support the 
majority, and more importantly the Constitution may. It is 
hard to challenge Judge Boudin’s assertion that the 
“Supremacy Clause operates in only one direction and has 
nothing to do with comity.”16 Maybe that fact alone is 
sufficient to justify the outcome. But, to borrow the Judge’s 
own phrase, that proposition has nothing to do with the 
federal government’s interests, overriding or not. On the 
contrary, it is essentially a way of saying that it doesn’t 
matter whether the federal government has an overriding 
interest. All it needs is to pretend it has one, to say: we 
want Pleau, give him to us.  
Interestingly, the vigorous dissent penned by Judge 
Torruella and joined by Judge Thompson accuses the 
majority of “unnecessary federal arrogance” but cites for its 
charge the majority’s line about the Supremacy Clause 
running in only one direction, not its fabrication of an 
overriding federal interest.17 The majority’s view of the 
Supremacy Clause may be arrogant; it also happens to be 
accurate. Its view of the overriding federal interest, on the 
other hand, is both arrogant and untrue. One wonders 
whether the dissent here is implicitly conceding the fact 
that it makes no difference whether the federal government 
has an overriding interest in Pleau. After all, the dissent 
does not counter the majority’s claim of an overriding 
federal interest; it simply rebuts its reading of the law. 
There is certainly nothing improper in Judge Torruella’s 
tack in that regard. The duty of a dissenting judge is to 
express his reasoning for why he disagrees on the result, 
and reasoning in the majority not necessary for the result is 
reasoning that does not demand a response. 
Still, one wishes for honesty if nothing else. If we have 
reached the point where the federal government can seize a 
prisoner from a state on a flimsy pretext that flies in the 
face of history, practice, and common sense, our Article III 
judiciary should so inform us. We have a right to know the 
current status of our constitutional system, particularly 
when it seems to have shifted so dramatically in an area—
criminal law—of crucial importance to all society. A petition 
for certiorari in United States v. Pleau has already been 
  
 16. Pleau, 680 F.3d at 6.  
 17. Id. at 12 n.17 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
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filed with the Supreme Court, and the case is therefore at 
the court's doorstep.18 Relatively free as it is from the fierce 
ideological emotions at play in the healthcare litigation, it 
will hopefully provide the high court an opportunity to tell 
us where we stand, for good or ill. 
  
 18. See Pleau v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
case-files/cases/pleau-v-united-states/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).  
